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Introduction
Access to improved drinking water has long been recognized as one of the main challenges of development. One of the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015. For Africa, achieving this objective is likely to represent an even greater challenge than in other regions of the world. A crucial challenge in improving the coverage of water services in poor countries is the fi nancing of investment in water production and distribution capacity. Th is issue has received considerable attention among the development community (see e.g. World Water Council, 2006) . Th e issue of water tariff s and subsidies has perhaps received less attention, although it is also crucial to the matter. Th is paper focuses on water tariff s and subsidies, both from a normative and a positive side.
Th is paper aims to present a basic conceptual framework for understanding the main practical issues and challenges relating to tariff s and subsidies in the water sector in developing countries. It introduces the basic economic notions relevant to the water sector ; presents an analytical framework for assessing the need for and evaluating subsidies ; and discusses the recent evidence on the features and performance of water tariff s and subsidies in various regions, with a special focus on Africa. Th e discussion is limited to the provision of drinking water to urban households in developing countries.
2 Among the issues examined are: (i) What are the main questions that arise when governments want to subsidize access to and consumption of water? (ii) What are the key features of water tariff s and subsidies that have been implemented around the world? (iii) How can we assess the performance of various subsidy programs? (iv) How well have subsidies performed in practice?
Rather than in producing new messages, the value added of the paper lies in its bringing together concepts and evidence from distinct fi elds of literature. On the one hand, theoretical publications on utility tariff s and subsidies have focused heavily on optimal incentive schemes for utility management as well as broader regulatory issues (see Joskow, 2005 , for a synthesis). On the other hand, empirical publications, mostly from development institutions, tend to focus on specifi c projects or countries and do not necessarily make explicit links or references to the theory. In the middle, the public fi nance-oriented literature, which has been used to provide analytical frameworks for the evaluation of subsidies in various sectors such as 1 Th e fi rst draft of this paper was written as a background for an intervention of the author at the Capacity Building Workshop on Partnerships for Improving the Performance of Water Utilities in the Africa Region, organized by UN-DESA in Nairobi during December 6-8, 2006 . I thank Jean-Michel Chéné, Daniel Platz and David O'Connor for useful comments and suggestions. Th e views refl ected here are the author's and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial position of the United Nations Secretariat. 2 Broader problems of water allocation across sectors, in which tariff s play an important role, are not elaborated upon.
However, it should be kept in mind that allocation of water between sectors has been and remains a pervasive policy issue, in developing and developed countries alike. Ineffi cient allocations sustained by distorted prices or subsidies to, e.g. agricultural water use, may generate waste of water and/or unsustainable water consumption. Th e problem is exacerbated in countries or regions where water is scarce. In those circumstances, re-allocation of the available water supply between customers may already go a long way to alleviating water scarcity problems; and getting incentives right for an effi cient use of water by diff erent users may prove to be the most urgent question to tackle.
education and housing, has rarely been used in the context of water provision. Th is paper, by bringing together those three strands of literature, aims at off ering practitioners a compact and unifi ed framework to think about tariff s and subsidies in the water sector.
Among various sources, the paper relies on two recent studies. Th e fi rst one, published in 2005 by Paul Joskow, reviews the theoretical underpinnings of water cost structure and tariff s (Joskow, 2005) and their implications for regulation. Th e second one, published in 2005 by the World Bank, carefully reviews most of the existing studies of water tariff s and subsidies in developing countries, with a view to assess their performance in targeting the poor (Komives and others, 2005) . Th e reader is referred to these two comprehensive papers for a more complete treatment of some the issues examined.
Th e paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework of drinking water provision in developing countries. It introduces the various ways by which water is supplied, the variety of water providers, as well as the institutional setting in which water distribution takes place. It then briefl y recapitulates the economics behind costs and tariff s in the water sector, with an emphasis on utilities. In section 3, water subsidies are introduced. Th is section also presents public economics criteria by which subsidy programs may be evaluated. Section 4 examines the performance of tariff s and subsidies, as analyzed from real cases. Th e fi nal section of the paper briefl y attempts to draw some lessons from the review of evidence undertaken in the previous sections.
Provision of Drinking Water: Basic Notions
Th is section presents the basic environment in which potable water provision occurs, with an emphasis on contexts found in developing countries. It also examines in more details the economics behind costs and tariff structures in water provision and highlights the main factors infl uencing the observed discrepancy between costs and tariff s.
2-1 Institutional Setting
Water provision in the urban context takes place in a legal and regulatory environment which typically combines several levels of intervention.
At the international level, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include several targets directly or indirectly related to water management. Th e target 10, which reads, "Halve by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation" has the most direct impact on national policies relating to access to drinking water.
At the national level, the following entities usually have a say in defi ning the environment in which provision of drinking water takes place:
Th e State, through line ministries in charge of water and sanitation, and sometimes through • ministries in charge of social programs (mostly for the subsidy aspect), Th e regulating agency, which may be part of the sector ministry or independent, • Intermediate levels of government, which may intervene for example in the implementation of • water subsidies, Municipalities, which are typically responsible for basic service provision in their jurisdictions, • and may own local utility companies.
Other stakeholders may be involved in policy-making to varying degrees depending on the country considered; they include in particular:
Water utility companies (public or private); • Alternative providers (communities, private sector entities); • Households, as well as other types of consumers (agricultural, commercial and industrial), di-• rectly or through intermediaries, e.g. community representatives.
It is not within the scope of this paper to explore the relations between these diff erent stakeholders, nor to examine how their interaction results in particular sets of policies, tariff s, and subsidies for water supply. However, the mere mention of this variety of stakeholders should make clear that political economy considerations play a key role in the outcomes observed at the national and local level. 3 In the context of this paper, which aims at examining the nature and performances of tariff s and subsidy programs, two specifi c points are worth emphasizing: First, the degree to which international goals such as the MDGs are integrated into national policies and percolate to local level actors such as utilities is highly variable. In some cases, the connection is minimal or even non-existent; that is, national goals in terms of access to potable water are not disaggregated into ground-level objectives and operational programs that would allow the achievement of these goals. 4 Second, at the national level, the diff erent actors (e.g. in a simple confi guration, the State, the regulator, the utility companies, and municipalities) have diff erent and potentially confl icting objectives. 5 In a context of private utility companies, these problems are exacerbated by asymmetric information, i.e., the utility has more information on its technology and costs than the regulator does. Th is generates informational rents, which the regulator has to minimize by designing adequate mechanisms. An associated problem is so-called "regulatory capture", by which the regulator may collude with utilities at the expense of the taxpayers.
Th e problems associated with asymmetry of information between utilities and their regulators have received a lot of attention in the economic literature. It is not the subject of this paper to describe them in detail, and the reader is instead referred to Joskow (2005) and Laff ont and Tirole (1993) . For the purpose of this paper, it suffi ces to note that these problems translate concretely into a question of credibility of regulators. In developing country contexts, where capacities may be limited, the independence of the regulator both from the Ministry of Water and from the utility companies (public or private) that operate the services has been a recurrent stumbling block in water sector reforms. 6 3 Th e focus here is on the supply of drinking water to urban households. When broader problems of water allocation, say between diff erent types of consumers, are considered, the number of stakeholders increase dramatically, and so does the importance of political economy considerations over economic considerations in the outcomes in terms of tariff s and subsidies. 4 Th is could stem from a number of factors, including: (i) the fact that the set of people who attend international meetings devoted to MDGs does not intersect with the set of local stakeholders implementing water policies on the ground, such as utility managers; (ii) the lack of comprehensive water policies, implementation plans, and related budgets; (iii) defi ciencies in the local implementation of national policies refl ecting the MDGs. 5 For example, the State may be concerned with universal access to piped water; with ways of ensuring that the poor benefi t from minimal standards of service; and with avoiding adverse environmental outcomes from water sector activities. Th e regulator will tend to focus on enforcing minimal standards of quality of service and norms for extension of the network. It may impose obligations of universal service upon the providers (see below). Municipalities will be concerned by aspects relating to provision in their jurisdiction. Lastly, utility companies will aim at maximizing profi ts under the prevailing regulatory constraints. 6 For an introduction to the challenges of pro-poor regulation in a developing country context, see Trémolet and Halphern, 2006. 
2-2 Diff erent Forms of Access and Provision
In contrast with developed countries where the provision of drinking water to households is overwhelmingly achieved through utilities, access to drinking water in developing countries encompasses many forms. Indeed, rates of connection to the public network vary a lot across countries, as well as within countries. Other forms of provision include:
Direct access to a water source (underground or surface); • Access to alternative sources of water, typically provided by the private sector (e.g. water tankers, • water carts, kiosks, bottled water); Access to piped water through community taps or standpipes. • In economic terms, water provision can be categorized as a multi-attribute product. Water services can be defi ned by (at least) three dimensions: price, quantity, and quality. Price refers to the price of a unit of drinking water (liter or cubic meter). Quantity refers to the number of such units. In the case of water services, quality must be added to the list, refl ecting the fact that diff erent forms of water provision are imperfect substitutes. Quality is a vector of attributes, which encompasses inter alia the following dimensions: composition in terms of toxins, pollutants, etc., hazardous to health; • degree of privacy and availability of the service (private house tap -yard tap -tanker -kiosk -• well, etc.); physical characteristics of the service (water fl ow at the tap; water pressure; etc.); • reliability of the service over time (predictability / advance notice for disconnection; shortage • periods; pressure variations; etc.).
It is important to note that in many countries, households have to rely on more than one source of water. Th is is the case even for families connected to the public network because limitations to the services provided by the utility can take many forms depending on the local context, including; rationing of certain areas; low water pressures; periodic shortages; or leaks in the network. Th e implications of this diversity in terms of social policies will be elaborated on in this paper.
2-3 Costs
We will mainly discuss the structure of costs for water utilities. Th is is a well studied domain, notably because knowledge of the cost structure of the water industry has for a long time been critical to regulatory institutions in developed countries. Moreover, the utility model is still seen as the standard paradigm for water services delivery in urban contexts and, as such, has received a lot of attention from governments, economists, fi nanciers, and development institutions. By contrast, the cost structure of alternative forms of provision is far less well known and has only recently come under scrutiny (see Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005) .
Water utilities typically engage in the production, treatment, transport and distribution of drinking water to customers located in their service area. Th ese activities typically have increasing returns to scale, at least up to a certain size (see Joskow, 2005) . Compared to other utilities like telecommunications and electricity, water production is very capital-intensive (see Komives and others, 2005, p33) .
7 Moreover, the capital assets used in water supply cannot be moved to another location and are generally unusable for any other purpose; they represent an extreme type of fi xed capital, associated with sunk costs.
As a consequence of these two features, water production is typically thought of as a natural monopoly. Th at is, it is typically the case that long-run marginal costs are below long-run average costs. A well known but very important consequence of this feature of the production technology is that, supposing it were possible to precisely defi ne a "marginal cost " that customers had to pay (see the discussion below), onepart tariff s based on marginal costs would not allow the utility to break even, since marginal costs are lower than average costs. Hence, water utilities tend to produce structural defi cits. Th is feature is at odds with the objective of cost recovery, needed for the long-term fi nancial sustainability of the utility.
Th eoretical solutions to this problem have long been known. Generally speaking, the solutions consist of engaging in some form of price discrimination, i.e. having diff erent consumers pay diff erent prices for the marginal unit of water (so-called "third-degree price discrimination"); having diff erent units sold at diff erent prices for any given consumer ("second-degree price discrimination", or non-linear tariff ); or a combination of both. Boiteux (1971) showed that the optimal uniform one-part tariff for a utility subject to a break-even constraint involves Ramsey pricing, i.e. consumers pay a markup over marginal cost that is inversely proportional to their price elasticity of demand.
8 A practical consequence of this fi nding is that industries, which have been found empirically to have higher price elasticities than individual consumers (see Komives and others, 2005, p18) , should be charged less per unit than the latter. In practice, it is very often the contrary which occurs. It was later shown (Brown and Sibley, 1986 ) that two-part tariff s consisting of a fi xed charge plus a variable charge refl ecting water consumption, where water is priced at marginal cost, could do even better than Boiteux pricing in terms of effi ciency. Among this class of tariff s, the most familiar structure is the one whereby customers share the fi xed costs equally, and pay the marginal price of the units they consume (see section 2-4 below).
In practice, it is diffi cult to apply those concepts as precisely as one would like. Th e main problem is to defi ne a marginal cost which should be applied to a particular consumer.
First, for the utility, short-run and long-run marginal costs of production diff er widely. Th e shortrun marginal cost of producing an additional cubic meter of water for a utility is typically very low, unless production capacity limits are reached (in which case there is the need for additional investment). Th e determinant of capacity needs will be the aggregation of individual consumer demands. Th is is analogous to electricity, where it is peak-load demand that really determines capacity needs. Relevant marginal costs of production should be the long-run costs.
Second, strictly speaking, short-run marginal costs vary across time. For example, water is scarcer during the dry season. To the extent that water has to be allocated between competing uses, tariff s should refl ect the associated varying opportunity cost. In practice though, it has not been judged practical to price water so as to refl ect all the sources of change in the costs of production.
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Th ird, the marginal cost of distributing an additional cubic meter of water for the utility varies, depending on which consumer gets it. Th is is because the cost of distribution varies with location, sometimes importantly. For example, marginal, mountainous areas located at the fringe of the city will be more expensive to service than centrally located, fl at areas. Moreover, a large portion of the costs incurred by the utility is not easily attributable to particular consumers. Th is is the case of the costs of operation and maintenance for the water mains and the secondary network. Deciding who should pay for what portion of the expenses involves a large degree of arbitrariness. In practice, tariff structures tend to be uniform over large areas, and consumers with high access costs are subsidized by low-access cost customers. Th is lack of spatial diff erentiation of tariff s can stem either from political unwillingness to diff erentiate tariff s, or from explicit non-discrimination obligations imposed by the regulator.
2-4 Tariff s
Utilities
As explained in Joskow (2005) , if tariff s were to refl ect costs, due to the structure of costs of utilities, the prevalent type of tariff s structure could take the form of a two-part tariff , composed of: a variable charge refl ecting the marginal costs of providing an additional cubic meter of water • for the utility; a fi xed charge intended to cover the unattributable portion of the costs that is independent of • the quantity consumed (fi xed costs of production and distribution), as well as ensuring that the utility can break even.
Th e simplest two-part tariff structure which ensures that the utility breaks even consists of dividing the fi xed costs equally among the consumers, and charging the marginal cost on all units consumed. If all consumers were identical, it would make sense to provide the service as soon as the net surplus of consumers is positive. However, in practice consumers diff er in income and tastes. In particular, the fi xed charge implied by an even sharing of fi xed costs may be large compared to the income of the poorest households. Some households facing this tariff structure will fi nd it rational not to connect to the network 10 , even though faced with a linear tariff they would consume a small quantity of water. Some households are then excluded from piped water consumption.
Provided the fi rm or the regulator has some information on the distribution of income and valuation of water services in the population, it is possible to improve on this outcome by combining second-and third-degree price discrimination. One solution is to propose a menu of non-linear tariff s which will better accommodate the heterogeneity of income and tastes in the population, and let households self-select into the tariff structures they prefer. For example, the utility can propose two tariff s: one "high-volume" service, with a high fi xed charge and a low marginal rate, and a "low-volume" service, with a lower fi xed charge but higher marginal rate. Households expecting to consume high quantities of water should select the former option, while those expecting to consume little water should select the latter (this example is drawn from Joskow, 2005) . Th is tariff diff erentiation should mitigate the problem of a high fi xed charge that could prevent poor households from connecting to the network. Such menus of tariff s have been used for decades in France for electricity. Such a menu is illustrated in fi gure 1. In this example, the fi rst tariff has a fi xed charge of US $4 and a volumetric rate of US $0.25 per cubic meter. Th e second tariff has a fi xed charge of US $2 and a volumetric rate of US$ 0.4. For consumption above 13 cubic meters, the fi rst tariff is more economical.
In practice however, water tariff s are often very diff erent from this theoretical structure. Table 1 below presents the most common forms of tariff s practiced by utilities. Prices paid for diff erent quanti-10 In this paragraph we consider only recurrent expenditures on water and abstract from one-shot connection fees incurred at the time of connection. As later explained, when they are large relative to the income of households, connection fees can in fact exacerbate the problem and result in high proportions of households choosing not to connect to the available public network.
ties of water under selected tariff s are shown on fi gure 2. Among the diff erent types of price structures presented here, Increasing Block Tariff s (IBTs) are by far the most common. In Latin America, IBTs frequently also include fi xed charges, which makes the traditional distinction between IBTs and two-part tariff s irrelevant (see Komives and others, 2005) . Importantly, in the absence of metering, only fi xed charge tariff s can be implemented, which has important consequences in terms of subsidies (see below).
An increasingly common form of provision consists of providing a menu of services, diff erentiated by quality, e.g. private connection and community taps. Another example is a menu of connections with diff erent technical characteristics (pressure, debit, etc.) . In those cases, a menu of tariff s will refl ect this diff erentiation. Yet another example is a menu of tariff s as the one described above in the diff erentiated two-part tariff . Th ose tariff s will be designed so as to induce households to self-select in the category that fi ts their needs best.
It is typically the case that subsidies are associated with such diff erentiated services. For example, consumption at public taps can be provided for free.
11 Th e objectives of such diff erentiated services and subsidies are : (i) to target subsidies to the poorer households or neighborhoods, by allowing households to self-select the form of service they prefer to use (the implicit assumption being that poor households are more likely to use the lower-quality service) ; and (ii) to achieve a greater coverage with the same amount of investment, lower quality services such as community taps being less costly to provide and covering the needs of more households than private connections.
Other providers
In the case of other providers, tariff s practiced depend on the nature of the provider. Community-based services or water services provided by NGOs can be expected to cover operation and maintenance costs.
11 Th is is the case in Kathmandu, Nepal. Th e precise way by which these costs are passed on to specifi c consumers, however, will depend on the local model. It can be assumed that private providers charge households prices that refl ect their costs.
2-5 Discussion
In conclusion, there is often a disconnection between the costs incurred by utilities, and the tariff s which are used. We already mentioned theoretical reasons why that is the case. However, technical and political factors come into play as well.
One reason for the disconnect between costs and prices comes from the structure of the water industry. Th e tendency of water utilities to exhibit structural defi cits, associated with the need for cost recovery, has often implied transfers from outside the utility. Th ese transfers can be implemented in many forms (see section 3 below). Concretely, in many countries capital expenditures are subsidized or paid for by municipalities or other levels of government. Cost recovery tends to be based on recurrent costs, not on capital costs; tariff s typically do not take into account the opportunity cost of capital. Th e important point is that, almost by construction, revenues collected from the consumers are not expected to cover total expenditures from the utility as they should from a fi nancial sustainability point of view.
Another reason why prices do not refl ect costs is technical. Implementing variable tariff s based on volume consumed by individual households supposes metering. In many countries, the proportion of connections which are metered is low. In many developed countries, the trend has been towards the generalization of metering, motivated by better incentive structures. Under a fi xed charge tariff , the water bill being independent of the quantity consumed, there is no incentive to save on water use. 12 However, in many developing countries, metering is not yet common. Moreover, in some cases, systematic metering may not be the best approach because the associated costs may be greater than the associated benefi ts.
Lastly, water tariff s, on top of economic considerations, frequently refl ect policy objectives.
13 Th e "natural monopoly" characteristics of water utilities, together with the politically sensitive nature of water 12 Th e eff ect of a change to a volumetric tariff can be sizeable. Available data show that the decrease in water consumption following the introduction of meters can be high (quoted fi gures are ten per cent in England, 20 per cent in Senegal). 13 A recent review of practices in developing countries concluded that tariff s are increasingly used to satisfy other objectives than cost recovery (OECD, 2003) . Source: author's elaboration provision, have often provided a rationale for government involvement in water provision. In some countries, government intervention tended to take the form of public ownership of utilities, with no separate regulation function. In many countries, this is still the dominant paradigm. Elsewhere, however, government intervention has evolved towards regulation, with production and distribution increasingly left to independent operators (public or private). Historically, regulation has given substantial consideration to the way monopoly rents are shared between utilities and the consumers, with an emphasis on consumers' interests. Th is implies a drive for "fair" tariff s, associated to policies such as universal service obligations aimed at ensuring access to "basic" services to the majority of or all the population.
Moreover, in large parts of the world, and especially in poor countries, the concept of water as a social good prevails over that of water as an economic good. As a result, it is often commonly admitted that full cost recovery is not an adequate objective in the case of water services. Th e transition from one concept to another may be driven by changing perceptions, higher incomes, or water shortages.
Whatever the precise form of institutional arrangement prevailing in a given country, public involvement in water matters means that water tariff s are not the direct product of market forces. Rather, tariff s (and subsidies) are determined by a number of factors, only some of which are related to costs. Th is explains the wide variety of tariff s schedules encountered across cities, regions, and countries.
Subsidies
Th is section reviews the various aspects of water subsidies. It begins with a short overview of the rationale for such subsidies (3-1) and their potential eff ects on the economy (3.2). Th e next sections examine who the recipients of water subsidies should be (3.3), and how subsidies should be fi nanced (3.4). Th e most common forms of water subsidies are presented in section 3-5. Section 3.6 presents criteria commonly used to evaluate water subsidies. Subsidy measurement issues are considered in section 3.7.
3-1 Th e Rationale for Water Subsidies
Access to safe drinking water has been recognized internationally as a basic human need. Access to safe water has tremendous direct and indirect impacts on poverty-related outcomes, the main of which are: 14 An improvement in health outcomes, and in particular infant mortality rates, and a correspond-• ing reduction in health expenses; A reduction in the time spent on fetching water (a task mostly undertaken by women and chil-• dren); the time thus freed can be used for education (children) and income-generating activities (women); At the aggregate level, a reduction in the incidence of epidemics whose propagation is facilitated • by lack of water for drinking and basic health practices 15 ; In the urban context, from the household's point of view, access to the public network often • translates into a reduction of the costs of accessing basic water requirements, which in the absence of such supply must be acquired from more costly alternative sources.
Th e relative importance of these benefi ts varies across locations, depending inter alia on the nature of alternative water resources available to households. However, there is no doubt that in most cases, projects off ering access to drinking water supply have very high social returns. 16 Moreover, from an examination of the various benefi ts provided by a connection to the water network, it appears that a lot of them are purely private.
Th is combination of public and private benefi ts from clean drinking water suggests it is a "merit good" which would be underconsumed if left entirely to the market. Th is is especially true in developing countries where a large portion of households does not have access to basic utilities or shelter. Th is may be considered the main reason for including access to safe drinking water in the Millennium Development Goals (Target 10, see above), and it explains why water has typically received a lot of attention from policy makers.
Another reason for government intervention is economies of scale. Economies of scale in water provision justify bulk provision of water, as opposed to individual provision, such that it is collectively rational to invest heavily, something individual households cannot do. Th is is compounded by the fact that water utilities are a highly capital-intensive activity, requiring investments at a scale only governments or private companies can achieve.
Other rationales for government intervention relate to market incompleteness, or to the mere poverty of households, all conditions that may prevail in the context of many developing countries.
Market incompleteness: Th is may apply to the time spent on fetching water. If no income generating activity is available as an alternative to fetching water, time and money are not substitutes and the household is better off fetching water than connecting to the network and incurring cash expenditures for which there is no corresponding additional income. Th is may also be the case for children sent to fetch water instead of attending school. In that case, households cannot borrow against the future income generated by a better education of their children to pay for the expenses of safe water. Again, the household is better off opting for the status quo. In such cases, the benefi ts provided by access to safe drinking water cannot be monetized. In the absence of additional cash to pay for safe water provision, households are caught in a liquidity trap that prevents choosing better water systems.
Poverty: Households can be so poor that they are at a corner solution for a particular category of goods or expenses (i.e. the utility-maximizing consumption bundle does not contain some of the goods). Th is is typically the case of luxury goods. For example, households may be too poor to face the health expenditures occasioned by a defi cient source of water. Th e fact that they are better off when safe water is provided constitutes a net welfare gain, but it does not follow that the households, even if they recognize it, would be willing to incur the corresponding expenditure, because they have no money to allocate to it.
Lastly, cultural factors are also important. In many contexts, low observed demand for improved water services is likely to come at least in part from lack of awareness of the benefi ts associated with drinking safe water, especially regarding health outcomes.
Th ese considerations strongly make the case for government intervention to facilitate access to safe water. If the poor do not have access to fi nancial markets and relevant information, or are discriminated against, subsidies targeting the most disadvantaged sections of the population are justifi ed. But other forms of intervention could also be contemplated to alleviate liquidity constraints, such as providing for the spreading over time of connection fees, e.g. by dividing the amount into small payments which are added to the periodic bill. Th is approach, which does not necessarily involve subsidies, 17 has been used in some countries. Awareness campaigns on the benefi t of safe water for drinking and basic hygiene are other types of intervention that may usefully complement subsidies.
Other considerations may apply. For a government with a concern for vertical equity, water subsidies may serve as a redistribution device. When the government can observe incomes, an income tax should suffi ce to achieve redistribution (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976) . 18 However, this conclusion is of little practical relevance in developing countries where income and wealth are not easily observable for a large part of the population, due to the importance of informal markets and the absence of monitoring systems. In that case, subsidizing water directly could lead to better targeted transfers. Th e empirical relevance of redistribution as a justifi cation for water subsidies is examined further in section 4 below.
Th rough the lessons learned by specifi c countries, there has also been a growing consensus that the institutional and regulatory environment in which water provision develops is of primary importance to understand its shortfalls or successes in reaching the poor. Refl ecting this new consensus, in complement to intervening directly through investment and/or subsidy programs, enabling the reform of institutions and providing related capacity building to government staff has been a growing activity of international donors during the past decade (see Trémolet, 2006 , for a study of four African countries).
3-2 Potential Effects of Water Subsidies
Th e eff ects of government taxes and expenditures (or other policies) on the economy are generally considered from the angles of allocation and redistribution (see e.g. Musgrave, 1959) .
Allocation
As a result of any policy, the allocation of resources is changed, i.e. the mix of goods and services produced by the economy is altered. In the case of water subsidies, another dimension which has practical importance is the impact of subsidies on the quality of water services provided to households.
Compared with other household subsidies (e.g. housing subsidies) which potentially aff ect many allocations in the economy, the primary impact of subsidies to drinking water is to aff ect the consumption choices of households. It can be expected that water subsidies to households will have smaller eff ects on the rest of the price system and the economy than housing subsidies, because the importance of water in the households' expenditures is limited. It typically represents between one and fi ve per cent of average household expenditures (see Komives and others, 2005, p 41-42) . Th us, on the household side, water subsidies can be expected to have signifi cant eff ects mainly on the margin between the consumption of water and the consumption of other goods. Generally speaking, water subsidies lower the price of water relative to the price of other consumption goods. If water is a normal good, both the substitution eff ect and the income eff ect are positive, and water is consumed in greater quantity. Th is should aff ect positively both the uptake (the number of households deciding to connect to the network, given access to it), and the consumption of water for connected households.
17 An interest rate can be charged so that the advance of the connection fee amount is equivalent to a loan. 18 Th is conclusion does not hold if there are positive externalities associated with safe water. In that case water subsidies could perform better than income subsidies, because they directly aff ect the water prices perceived by households.
Another margin that can be aff ected is labor supply (or school enrollment). As piped water replaces water fetched from distant sources, household members are able to supply more work time (intensive margin), or even to enter the labor force (extensive margin). Th e eff ects of access to water programs or projects on, say, women's labor supply have unfortunately received little attention, as far as we are aware.
On the production / supply side, the margins most likely to be aff ected are:
Th e overall investment in water and sanitation achieved in the economy. Depending on the way i.
subsidies are delivered and fi nanced by the government, they can alter the returns on investment in the sector and potentially deter investment in that sector. Th e type of water providers operating in the market. Subsidies to public water companies, in the ii.
form of tax rebates, fi nancial support of current expenditures, or subsidized fi nancing, distort competition in the sector. It can aff ect the willingness of non-utility providers (e.g. private alternative providers) to enter the market. Th e total quantity of water produced and consumed. In practice, it is diffi cult to say in which iii.
direction the quantity of water produced changes, compared with a situation without subsidies. First, in a typical developing country, utilities may be under-fi nanced and in a situation of rationing (either through limiting the number of connections or through rationing the supply to certain days / hours in the day / geographical zones, etc.). Higher demand in this case does not translate into higher supply. Second, the crowding out eff ects mentioned in point ii above will aff ect the overall size of the market, and hence the quantity of water produced and distributed. Th e quality of water services provided to households. As mentioned above, subsidy programs iv.
can be expected to have an impact on service quality. Indeed, some performance-based subsidies are explicitly aiming at improving some aspects of service quality. Th ose could also be the indirect consequences of subsidies based on other targets [like a decrease in unaccounted-for water (UfW), or better collection rates].
Th ese factors must be taken into account for developing sound policies in the water sector. In many developing countries, coverage by the public piped network is not universal and public budgets do not allow enough investment to achieve full coverage, and alternative providers are eff ectively providing for the basic water needs of an important part of the population.
Distribution
Government policies explicitly or implicitly redistribute resources. Th e fundamental issue is then how policies change the distribution of income within the economy. Th is generic question can be broken down into several specifi c sub-questions. In particular, one is often concerned with vertical redistribution (are the transfer fl ows induced by the subsidy going from the rich to the poor, from decile y to decile z of the income distribution, etc.) and horizontal redistribution (comparing the situation of diff erent household sub-groups in a particular income range before and after the redistribution caused by the subsidy).
3-3 Defi ning Effi ciency, Equity, and Coverage
Th e questions of allocation and distribution can be given a more practical sense. Th e economic analysis of social programs usually relies on three criteria: effi ciency, equity or targeting, and coverage.
Effi ciency:
Th e notion of effi ciency relates to the allocation of resources in the economy. Th us, the general question to be asked is "Can the same resources be used more effi ciently, and to what extent?". However, the very sensitive question of optimal water allocation has often been relegated to general macro-economic discussions. Within the water sector, effi ciency is often examined in a "restricted" sense and relates to the technical and commercial effi ciency of utility companies.
Technical effi ciency relates to the cost of providing a cubic meter of treated water. As discussed in section 3, there are multiple determinants to this cost, and the government or regulator often has to rely on indirect information in order to assess the effi ciency of production of a particular utility company. Benchmarking, i.e. examining the performance of utilities sharing "similar" characteristics, has been a popular technique to overcome, at least in part, problems of asymmetric information. Benchmarking can also be associated with incentive mechanisms, by linking subsidies or government funding to the performance of the utilities, as measured by comparisons between them. Th is system has been popular in other sectors such as hospitals and is often referred to as "yardstick competition" (Schleifer, 1985) .
Commercial effi ciency relates to the effi ciency of the stages going from the distribution of the water produced to the collection of payments from customers. Ultimately, the ability of the utility to limit the physical and fi nancial losses from distribution and commercialization will determine the degree of sustainability of the company. It is customary to distinguish: Th e proportion of water which is billed (the complement of which is the unaccounted-for water, • UfW). Losses can be due to physical problems (leaks); to illegal connections; and to lack of billing for certain connections; Th e proportion of billed consumption which is collected. • As will be explored below in section 5, commercial effi ciency has been an almost universal problem for developing country utilities. Th e proportion of water which eventually gets paid for is often very small, which jeopardizes the fi nancial health of utility companies. In the case where water services are provided by the private sector, it is often the case that contracts between the delegating authority and the provider explicitly include targets (and associated penalties) in terms of indicators related to effi ciency, such as UfW or collection rates.
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In the context of subsidies, the relevant question is whether a particular subsidy program gives incentives to utility companies or other providers to improve technical and commercial effi ciency. As far as policy evaluation is concerned, major outcomes will be water production or consumption changes occurring as a result of the policy. A notion related to effi ciency appropriate in such a case is the leverage eff ect of a program, i.e., how much supplemental investment (in water treatment capacity for a utility, or in equipment for safe water provision for a household) will be generated by one dollar of subsidy.
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Targeting/Vertical Equity:
Vertical equity relates to the redistribution of income due to the subsidy system and can be explicit or implicit. Targeting, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which subsidies go to those who need them most. 21 It is traditionally measured by the proportion of transfers which reaches the intended benefi ciaries. It is clear that the ability to defi ne intended benefi ciaries assumes the existence of a strategy in the fi rst place, which is not always the case. 22 Computing (or qualitatively assessing) the distribution of transfers implied by a subsidy is necessary for assessing its targeting, coverage and effi ciency. Th us, it is worth drawing the attention of policymakers to this broader issue, instead of focusing only on targeting.
Coverage:
Coverage refers to the proportion of the target population eff ectively reached by the subsidy. As the numerous evaluation studies for water subsidies make clear, this may be the most important factor to take into account to analyze the performance of water access strategies in developing countries. Low coverage by the public networks considerably limits the outreach and redistributive power of subsidies through utility tariff s (see Komives and others, 2005 , and section 4 below). It also generates horizontal equity problems, since similar households are treated diff erently depending on whether they are connected or not. By contrast, in a developed country context where coverage is almost universal, the quality of targeting of water subsidies becomes the most important criterion.
As with other subsidy programs, coverage and targeting are somewhat antagonistic goals in the sense that a government may have diffi culties to achieve good targeting and high coverage simultaneously. A convenient way to summarize this antagonism is to visualize it in terms of a matrix crossing the type of households with the outreach of the subsidy (see e.g. Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004) . To simplify, suppose that the population can be divided without errors into two categories of households, "Poor" and "non-Poor". Suppose also that the "Poor" category is the offi cial target of subsidies. For any given subsidy program, a two-by-two table (see table 2 ) can be constructed, giving the partition of the population depending on the poverty category and the benefi t of the subsidy program.
If the program were perfect, cells off the diagonal of the table should be empty sets. On the contrary, the presence of households in the upper right cell of the matrix indicates problems of targeting, or leakages, i.e. households not included in the target group benefi t from the subsidy. Th e presence of households in the lower left cell of the matrix indicates problems of coverage, i.e. populations included in the target group are not reached by the subsidy.
In practice, the problem is compounded by measurement issues (see table 3 ). Owing to the difficulty of measuring poverty and income in general, eligibility for subsidies often has to be determined based on proxy variables. Inevitably, the use of proxies will cause two types of errors. First, some poor households which belong to the target group will be classifi ed as non-poor and thus left out of the subsidy scheme. By analogy with statistical tests, it is common to refer to these errors as "Type 1 errors" or "errors of exclusion". Second, the opposite will also happen, i.e. non-poor households will be inappropriately classifi ed as poor on the basis of the proxies. Th is is often called "Type 2 error".
Finding good proxies is thus crucial to good targeting, both ex ante (e.g. in designing the subsidy scheme) and ex post, in order to check that Type 1 and Type 2 errors are kept under control.
21 From a semantic point of view, "Targeting" refers to a normative policy objective, whereas "distribution" refers to a positive analysis tool. 22 For example, strategies for extension of the network may be dictated by considerations of easiness and fi nancial feasibility for the utility company, and not so much by priorities based on income or poverty criteria. In the context of water consumption subsidies distributed through low tariff s by utilities to households connected to the network (e.g. through an IBT with subsidized fi rst block), reaching the intended benefi ciaries is complicated by a series of hurdles. More precisely, the fi nal distribution of consumption subsidies to diff erent groups of households will depend on:
Th e proportion of households having potential access to the network;
• Th e proportion of households living in an area with access to the network that choose to con-• nect; Th e consumption of water of connected households, which determines the amount of subsidies • they receive.
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For policy purposes, it is very important to understand which of those hurdles are really constraining the outreach of subsidies to target benefi ciaries. Th e World Bank review paper (Komives and others, 2005) introduces a neat framework to measure the targeting performance of subsidies based on this decomposition. It turns out that such decomposition allows powerful insights on the ways to improve subsidy performance. For example, it allows one to answer questions like: "How would the distribution of subsidies be modifi ed if connection rates in the poor neighborhoods were increased to a certain level?". Some illustrations of this analysis are presented in section 4.
3-4 Who Should Get Which Subsidies?
As mentioned above, the dominant paradigm in the thinking about water subsidies is the utility model. Although subsidies can be provided by other channels which will be examined in detail below, it is necessary to spend some time on the case of subsidies conveyed through the utility model, because they constitute the bulk of existing subsidies, both in developed and developing countries.
By defi nition, consuming drinking water through the piped network necessitates a connection to the network. Th us, there are two economic margins to consider: (i) the extensive margin, i.e., the decision to connect to the network or not; and (ii) the intensive margin, i.e. the decision on how much water to consume given connection. Correspondingly, subsidies to households through the utility can take two different forms (or a combination of them): (i) subsidies to connection; and (ii) subsidies to consumption, e.g. through reduced unit prices. Th e latter kind of subsidies is by far the most common. It is often implemented through IBTs or VDTs.
For public policy purposes, the diff erence is particularly important. How should the public eff ort and monies be divided between helping utilities to extend the network, and helping connected customers to pay their water bills? Ultimately, the answer to this question should come from the examination of local situations. In a very schematic way, one can think of decomposing the population in a given area in four groups, depending on whether they would have diffi culties to pay the monthly bill corresponding to a sub-23 Th e proportion of connections which are metered is also a determinant factor, since it conditions the use of diff erentiated tariff s, the only alternative in the absence of metering being fi xed charges. Depending on the local distribution of income and the tariff s practiced by utility companies, the relative importance of the four categories will vary.
Th is classifi cation and the suggested way to come to it oversimplify and thus are potentially misleading. More adequate strategies for examining the needs for subsidies will be discussed below. However, the important point is that public interventions should target the diff erent categories of households in diff erent ways. Table 4 below illustrates this point.
How to improve the determination of groups needing subsidies and of needed subsidy levels? Th ere are several tools at the disposal of policy makers. First, household consumption and expenditure surveys are common in many countries and can be replicated locally. Information on water consumption by households, about the price they pay for piped water and water from other sources, can be used to compute the proportion of the total budget that is devoted to water expenditures by diff erent income groups. From this, estimates of the needs for water subsidies can be constructed.
Second, the willingness to pay (WTP) of households for network water services can be assessed, either directly through specifi c surveys (the so-called "contingent valuation" approach), or indirectly through data on consumption of and expenditures on alternative water services (the so-called "revealed preference" approach). Although there are methodological diffi culties associated to WTP surveys, and one must be careful in designing the surveys and interpreting the results (see e.g. Komives and others, 2005) , reliable estimates of the WTP for network connection or service improvements can be retrieved from local surveys. Th e examination of results from such surveys in various contexts suggests that the willingness of households to pay for upgraded water services may be higher than what the reluctance of politicians to make benefi ciaries pay would lead one to believe, suggesting that some degree of cost recovery is not necessarily incompatible with provision of services to poor areas or populations.
Th e diff erence between connection and consumption subsidies is important for another reason. Connection subsidies are one-shot subsidies, akin to subsidies to any capital investment. By contrast, subsidizing consumption entails a continuous fl ow of money towards the utilities or the recipient households, and corresponding recurrent expenditures (for the government) or losses (for the utility). It is clear that the consequences of each type of subsidy for the government budget (or for the fi nancial health of the utility company) are not the same. Lastly, politically speaking, connection subsidies may be more visible than consumption subsidies, but may yield lower long-term payoff , since households will quickly tend to forget that their connections were subsidized and focus on their paying the full tariff .
3-5 Who Should Pay for Subsidies?
Th e question "Who should pay for subsidies?" is ambiguous, but intentionally so. Indeed, it may be interpreted in two ways. Th e fi rst one refers to an equity issue, and corresponds to the question "Who should bear the burden of water subsidies?". Th ere is no normative answer to this question. In practice, depending on the political context, the answer could be the general public; the benefi ciaries; particular groups of the society; etc. Th e second one refers to a fi nancing issue, and the underlying question is "How can the subsidies be fi nanced?". Depending on, e.g., the development of the local fi nance markets, and the fi nancial status of utility companies, the answer could be through private loans; through general taxes; through specifi c taxes or user fees; through cross-subsidies; etc.
In the context of developed countries, the frontiers between the two questions are (or should be) distinct. However, in many developing countries, those frontiers get blurred, because of:
(i) the sometimes precarious fi nancial state of utility companies, and (ii) the weak development of fi nancial markets. Both factors combine to give fi nancing issues the front stage, whereas the equity (incidence) issue is relegated to a secondary status. For the rest of the discussion, it is convenient to distinguish connection subsidies and consumption subsidies.
Due to the precarious fi nancial state of utility companies, consumption subsidies, which directly impact on the revenues of the utility, are a direct threat to its sustainability. If the latter is to be assured, subsidies must be compensated in some way. Th ere are two usual and non-exclusive ways to achieve this: transfers from the government, and cross-subsidies. Cross-subsidies describe a mechanism by which a group of consumers pays a price for the service higher than the cost to the utility, thereby subsidizing other groups of consumers (e.g. the poorest ones) or activities of the utility (e.g. expansion of the network).
26 Cross-subsidies, at least in theory, have the attractive political feature that the compensation occurs within the utility and does not necessitate budget transfers from the government. However, in practice, achieving this goal supposes a careful balancing of subsidized and unsubsidized groups, so that the latter can eff ectively pay for the former. As explained below in section 5, this equilibrium is sometimes hard to maintain.
Due to the combination of the two factors mentioned above, utilities rarely manage to free up resources or mobilize fi nance for new investments. Financing network extension, which is often a prerequisite for a program of connection subsidies, then becomes the crux of the matter, and the most pressing problem is to fi nd practical means of enabling utilities to mobilize cash to fi nance their investments costs. Crosssubsidies have been one way to achieve this (see Laff ont and N'Gbo, 2000) . In many countries, it has been customary to make developers fi nance the costs of bringing water to new developments. A proportion of those costs, which varies across countries, is then repaid to the developer by the utility afterwards. 27 Other ad hoc solutions include dedicated Funds fi nanced by surcharges on bills (Côte d'Ivoire, Argentina). However, in many countries, utilities or municipalities still have to rely on grants by the Government or by donors to fi nance network extension.
3-6 Implementing Common Forms of Water Subsidies 28
Given well-defi ned objectives for a subsidy program (and in particular, supposing that intended benefi ciaries are clearly defi ned), designing the program essentially entails two generic questions: (i) how to channel subsidies to benefi ciaries? (ii) how to target benefi ciaries? Th ese two issues are examined in turn.
Channels for water subsidies
As should be clear from the variety of tariff s which have been presented in section 2-4, there is also considerable variety in the types of subsidies to consumers. Moreover, tariff s are only one way to subsidize water services. It is conceptually useful to distinguish two channels for subsidies:
indirect subsidies through prices of water services; • direct subsidies to end consumers. • Examples of indirect subsidies comprise block tariff s and volume-diff erentiated tariff s, which have built-in subsidies. Th ese subsidies are called "indirect", because they are not paid directly to the end consumer. Rather, the utility company is generally compensated by the government for losses arising from belowcost tariff s. In an increasing block tariff (IBT), consumers consuming less than a threshold quantity of water (often the fi rst block limit, but in certain cases the second and subsequent blocks may also be subsidized) pay a discount unit price on this volume. Th e justifi cation for adopting such tariff structures is that "basic" consumption should be provided at a discounted rate, whereas consumption above basic needs should be priced at full cost, or even cross-subsidize users that stay in the fi rst blocks. Th e performance of IBTs as a subsidy mechanism will be discussed in section 4.
Example of the second channel comprise connection subsidies, and direct consumption subsidies. Direct consumption subsidies are paid directly to households meeting certain eligibility criteria to cover part of their water bill. Th e main advantages of direct subsidies are that they are transparent, explicit, and minimize distortions in the behavior of water utilities and their customers. Th e main drawbacks of direct subsidies are the diffi culty of defi ning suitable eligibility criteria as well as the administrative cost entailed in identifying eligible households. Th e direct subsidy system was pioneered by the Chilean government in 1990, when it was successfully used to soften the distributional impacts of a convergence towards cost-refl ective water tariff s.
Targeting methods
Whereas subsidies through tariff s can be applied to all customers irrespective of their condition, it is often the case that some degree of targeting is involved: subsidies do not apply across the board, but are limited to consumers meeting certain criteria. It is customary to distinguish explicit targeting from implicit targeting.
Explicit targeting is based on a priori classifi cation of consumers into groups eligible for diff erent subsidies, based on observed variables. Ideally, such classifi cation should be based on individual household 28 Th e reader interested in a more systematic overview of the main forms of water subsidies is referred to the wide body of literature on the topic (in particular, see the references in Komives and others, 2005) .
status in terms of income (and perhaps other socio-economic characteristics), in order to target subsidies to those households who really need them. However, this supposes that income is easily observable, and that an administrative system to monitor it is put in place. In many countries, these two conditions are not met. On the one hand, due to the importance of the informal economy, household income is hard to estimate. On the other hand, putting in place an administrative system for the purpose of administering water subsidies often proves very costly. Th ese obstacles have prevented most countries from going into that direction. In countries whose informal economy is not too important, one way to circumvent the diffi culty associated with the costs of the income monitoring system is to utilize multi-purpose systems, which serve to defi ne the eligibility criteria for multiple social benefi ts. Th e Ficha CAS system in Chile is one example of such a system (for a description, see Box 6.2 in Komives and others, 2005, p 109 ).
In the absence of a system to monitor income directly, selection of eligible households has to rely on proxy variables for income. Th e most commonly used systems are geographic targeting and communitybased selection. Geographic targeting consists in defi ning the eligibility for subsidies based on the residence in certain zones or neighborhoods (e.g. districts) which are identifi ed as "poor", while residents of "nonpoor" districts are not eligible. Community-based selection consists in letting community members decide which of their members "merit" the subsidy the most. Th is system has been used in Cambodia. Th e performance of these selection devices as proxies for income will be discussed in section 4.
Implicit targeting refers to mechanisms where households self-select into the diff erent categories of service (subsidized or unsubsidized), rather than being selected ex ante by the government. Th is approach is increasingly used to deliver subsidies or benefi ts in a variety of sectors (see Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott, 2004 ). An example of implicit targeting is the case of the multiple two-part tariff discussed in section 2-4, which can be designed so as to allow low-consumption users to be separated from high-consumption users. Another example is when the utility company off ers, in parallel with private connections, yard or community taps in which consumption is priced below cost. In that case, achieving a good targeting of the poor supposes that a majority of rich households having the choice between the two services will opt for the individual connection, while the poor will use public taps.
Implicit and explicit targeting are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are often combined. A typical example would be diff erentiated services such as individual connections and community taps, where community taps are off ered as a possibility only within certain targeted neighborhoods.
3-7 Other Criteria for Evaluating Subsidies
Apart from core economic criteria such as effi ciency, equity, and coverage, other public fi nance criteria are commonly used to analyze subsidy programs. Th e criteria vary and may bear diff erent names from one author to another (for a discussion, see Le Blanc, 2004) . It is convenient to group the most utilized criteria into two groups. Th e fi rst group gathers criteria which relate to the political economy dimension, and include administrative simplicity, incentives, and transparency. Th e second group comprises criteria related to the long-term management of subsidy programs, such as visibility, sustainability, and fl exibility. Th ose criteria and their importance in the context of water subsidies are briefl y discussed below.
Administrative Simplicity
Administrative simplicity can be seen from the governments or consumer's sides. From the administration's point of view, other things being equal, subsidy programs should be designed so as to minimize total costs, which include the government's administration, monitoring and enforcement costs but also indirect costs, such as those cost associated with legal disputes arising from the implementation of the program, e.g. from private utilities wanting to renegotiate their contracts with the government or municipality. From the benefi ciaries' perspective, administrative costs include the time required for applicants to locate the appropriate offi ce where to apply, to understand and to fi ll out the requested forms, and to participate in the program. From a practical point of view, it has to be noted that very often only direct costs are known. Since they are of no signifi cant interest to governments, indirect costs are rarely known without ad hoc studies, even in the case of budgeted programs.
Transparency
Transparency refers to the clarity of the program's eligibility and participation criteria and eff ective implementation by the responsible entities. Since this criterion is more qualitative than others, it might best be defi ned it through a number of questions: How clear are the rules for allocation of public funds to the various states, to local governments? At the local government level, how are benefi ciaries identifi ed and selected under the programs? Are there well-defi ned eligibility criteria for the subsidies? Are responsibilities in subsidy allocation clearly defi ned? Is subsidy distribution managed by an independent entity? Are any slots for program participation reserved for the administration or local authorities?
Th e degree of transparency of subsidies provided through utilities is highly variable. Chile, for example, has a highly transparent system of direct water subsidies. Cross-subsidies, which are prevalent in the water context, are often far less visible than that, except for the utility. Th e geographic variability of water tariff s is also an impediment to the readability of subsidies through water tariff s. Th at is, most subsidies are implicit to a certain degree, and only the utility companies and the government/ regulator are able to estimate precisely how they work and to whom they apply.
Incentives/political responsibility/popularity:
Th is criterion is perhaps the most qualitative of all. However, from a policy point of view, it is perhaps one of the most important in the water context. Th e questions underlying this criterion might be the following: Are the incentives of the diff erent stakeholders compatible with public policy goals? e.g., given the fi nancial arrangements between the government and the utility, do utilities have an economic incentive to extend the network, service poor areas, increase metering, decrease unaccounted-for water (UFW)? Are individuals or institutions responsible for choosing participants in the subsidy program accountable, and to whom? Are institutions in charge of the program's implementation given adequate fi nancial and technical means? E.g., are subsidies passed on to consumers through lower tariff s compensated by the government in a way that is fi nancially sustainable for the utility? Do entities in charge of the program have incentives to keep the program under control (total cost for public budgets, cost recovery, etc.)? Does the program receive substantial support from the public and from politicians? Th e importance of these questions to water subsidies compared to e.g., housing subsidies or direct budget support, is accentuated by the fact that intermediaries such as utilities stand between the government and the end consumer. Th erefore, a complex range of incentives exists, which have to be taken into account when designing subsidy programs. In particular, when the provision of water is done by the private sector, regulation is of key importance to mitigate potential adverse incentives to provide low-quality services. Another relevant factor is that physical capital in the water industry is very long-lived. 29 Th erefore, a lack of 29 Th e infrastructure associated with surface water storage and conveyance and the pipe network can have an economic life of 40-60 or more years, longer than that of capital employed in the manufacturing industry or in other public utility sectors.
appropriate maintenance translates only very gradually to decreased quality of services. On the other hand, one-shot investment expenditures, e.g. to extend the network, are politically very visible. As a result, this feature generates incentives for short-sighted, resource-constrained governments to under-provide and delay necessary fi nancing of operation and maintenance expenditures of water utilities.
Visibility:
Th is criterion refers to the degree of visibility of all costs of the subsidy for taxpayers and citizens. In order to measure visibility, one must fi rst determine the actual subsidy cost and then determine how explicitly defi ned these costs are in the government's budget. From a policy point of view, improving the visibility of a program has signifi cant benefi ts, such as better understanding of the full economic cost of providing assistance, better targeting in practice, and potentially less corruption. As a rule, costs are better known for subsidies on the State budget. 30 In the case of water, which necessitates high levels of capital investment, the visibility of the costs of public investment programs can be expected to be low, since these programs will consist in one-shot infusions of capital (often fi nanced by donors), which are to be reimbursed in the long term as part of the country's or municipality's debt.
Flexibility:
Th is notion corresponds to the ease with which a particular program can be modifi ed (parameters and / or implementation) or even terminated. In the context of water subsidies, this is best understood in the political sense: can the program be modifi ed or terminated without major political unrest?
Sustainability:
It can be argued that "sustainability" is meaningless for an isolated policy because the government's budget constraint implies a tradeoff between policy choices. 31 However, this criterion can be applied in the following sense: given the present economic situation and reasonable forecasts, will the policy still be feasible in ten years, or will it require major changes in design, or even be dropped? In the water context, sustainability problems are notably driven by the highly capital-intensive nature of the industry. Th e main issue is the compatibility of investment programs with the subsequent expenditures that must be incurred (typically by local governments) on operation and maintenance to sustain the investments. Th is has been a pervasive problem in many developing countries.
Sustainability can also refer to technical capacities at the country or local level to manage the utilities or, in the case of public-private partnerships, the relations with the private providers, once initial investments or projects have been delivered.
3-8 Subsidy Measurement Issues
As the discussion above illustrates, some of the criteria used for the analysis of subsidy programs are not easily identifi ed through quantitative indicators, except at times on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, some criteria have multiple dimensions, and various indicators may be required to identify a particular criterion. Moreover, even when quantitative indicators come to mind, their practical computation may be complicated, and as such, not easily available. Th us, in most cases, qualitative or semi-quantitative information summarizing program performance under specifi c criteria must be identifi ed.
Th is section is concerned with two of the most common problems analysts face when examining water subsidy programs, namely: measuring the total amount of subsidies received by households; • measuring the distributional impact of those subsidies. • Once again, in this section our framework of reference is the utility model. In some cases, subsidies are on-budget, direct transfers to the end consumer, and the utility receives no subsidy. It is then relatively straightforward to answer the two questions above, because it can be assumed that the tariff s paid by the households refl ect the full costs to the utilities. 32 33 Usually, though, money transfers go from the government to utility companies, not to households. Th e basic problem here is to identify the benchmark price (tariff ) that should be used to compute the value of the subsidy received by the households. Due to the presence of the utility between the government and end consumers, not all of what comes out of government budget may reach the household's pocket. Ineffi ciencies at the production and distribution levels can result in a "waste" of money. Th e issue, then, is to measure these ineffi ciencies. Also, transfers from the government may be combined with cross-subsidies. In such cases, how is it possible to calculate the share of the amount transferred that is passed on to households?
Demand-side (consumer) approach
In this approach, which relies on household survey data, including consumption of water and price paid for it, one typically computes the subsidy amount as the diff erence between what the consumer actually paid and the price that "should have been paid", given observed consumption and a "normal" price" (see fi gure 3). Aggregation across consumers by quantiles of the income distribution then yields a measure of distribution of the subsidy across income groups. Th is is the approach taken by most of the studies reviewed in the World Bank study (Komives and others, 2005) .
Th e main diffi culty of this approach is to defi ne a "normal" price or tariff that should refl ect the full economic cost of water provision of the utility. Th is variable is not available in most household survey datasets. Usually, the rate of the highest block in the IBT schedule is taken as a proxy for it; however, direct examination shows that those rates overestimate or underestimate costs, depending on the case. Apart from the diffi culties of defi ning the "normal" price or tariff , this calculation amounts to a static, tax expenditurestyle amount -i.e. it neglects the changes in consumption that would occur, should the household face the "true" tariff . Depending on the precise nature and implementation of the subsidies, it can be expected that changes in consumption would not be negligible in most cases.
Another methodological problem encountered is that subsidies are often measured with reference to water bills, not amounts eff ectively paid to the utility. Given the sometimes huge diff erences between billing and collection, this can result in both an underestimation of eff ective subsidies and biases in the estimation of their distributional eff ects.
32 Even in Europe or in the US, water tariff s often fail to refl ect environmental costs (OECD, 1999) . 33 However, as seen above, there are conceptual problems with the defi nition of a "marginal cost" in the case of water services, because : (i) temporal variations typically not refl ected into prices ; (ii) high-cost and low-cost customers are typically paying the same price for water, at least locally ; (iii) a high proportion of costs are not attributable to specifi c customers.
Supply-side (utility) approach
In this approach, the point of view is that of the government and the unit of observation is the utility. Th is can be called the "diff erence method", because subsidies to consumers are calculated as the diff erence between transfers from the government to the utility, minus all the losses incurred by the utility due to inefficiencies (see fi gure 4). Th e government provides a transfer to the utility to help it cope with current expenditure requirements (either to break even or to achieve profi t). Th e proportion of this amount that goes to end consumers is negatively aff ected by any loss of effi ciency occurring from production, distribution, billing or collection of payments. Th e problem is then to measure these losses. Th e latter two can be measured directly; the former two can be estimated by benchmarking.
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Th is approach is interesting because its results allow policy makers to separate out effi ciency considerations from consumer subsidy problems. With very ineffi cient utilities, it may well be the case that most of the government transfers are wasted; it could even happen that consumers end up subsidizing the utility, compared to a more effi cient situation. Note that in this approach, cross-subsidies are netted out because they represent transfers internal to the utility. As a result, distributional impacts of the subsidy cannot be obtained.
In conclusion, getting an accurate idea of the real impact of subsidies built into water tariff s implies examining both the economic (i.e. technical and commercial) performance of the utilities delivering those 34 Th is approach corresponds directly to the one taken by many projects in the water and sanitation sector, which heavily focus on the physical and commercial performance of utilities. Benchmarking is of primary interest in such cases, in order to examine the structure of costs and revenues, as well as to locate ineffi ciencies in production, distribution, metering, billing, and collection.
Source: Author's elaboration subsidies, and the distribution of water consumption at the household level. Results obtained from micro, demand-side approaches are dependent on the "normal price" taken into account for the subsidy calculation. Supply-side approaches, and benchmarking in particular, can help assess what this "normal price" would be.
How Do Subsidies Fare in Practice?
Th is section examines the various aspects of the performance of water subsidy programs implemented across the world. We concentrate on a group of criteria outlined in the previous section, especially effi ciency and equity. Th ose criteria focus on the direct eff ects of subsidies. Th us, unless otherwise stated, we do not look in detail at the eff ects of subsidies on important outcomes such as health and children's education. Th e section follows the plan of sections 2 and 3. It successively examines the issues of access to piped water; water prices; subsidy benefi ciaries; fi nancing of subsidies; and coverage targeting of subsidies. A fi nal subsection tries to place the debate on the eff ectiveness of water subsidies within a broader context.
4-1 How do the Poor Fare in Terms of Access?
A look at aggregate regional fi gures shows that access to an improved source of water is far from universal. Another striking feature is the contrasts between urban and rural areas (table 5) . A more disaggregated look at country fi gures (fi gure 5) confi rms that Africa is lagging behind the other continents, both for urban and rural access.
Data on African capital cities (fi gure 6) shows the extent of variation in access rates, measured by access to piped water. In 2000, the proportion of households having access to piped water varied from 27% Komives, Whittington, and Wu, 2001, and others, 2005) . Figure 7 illustrates the diff erence in access to private water connections between poor and non-poor for some cities in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Although the magnitude of the gap between poor and non-poor varies, it is a common feature of all the places analyzed in the studies reviewed by the World Bank paper.
As a result, by construction, consumption subsidies delivered through the utility network (i.e. to connected users) miss a substantial part of the potential benefi ciaries. Th is feature can have huge impacts on both the targeting of water subsidies and their redistribution eff ects in developing countries.
4-2 Th e Price of Water
Utilities
Utilities often charge an initial connection fee, after which the household has to pay periodic (typically, monthly) bills that may or may not depend on its water consumption. Available evidence on connection fees presented in Komives and others (2005) found that water connection charges varied widely across cities and countries, ranging from only US$2 to US$450 (table 6).
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As for water use charges, they also exhibit high variation. Results from a worldwide survey of utility companies by Global Water Intelligence, documented in Komives and others (2005) , are represented below in fi gure 8. Th e fi gure shows the distribution of average water tariff s charged by utilities by continent. Boxes represent the part of the distribution comprised between the 25 th and 75 th percentiles, while the extremities of the bars show the observed minimum and maximum tariff s. From this fi gure, it is apparent that apart from OECD where water tariff s are above US$1/m 3 for half of the utilities included in the sample, tariff s in the other regions of the world tend to be signifi cantly lower than that level. Whereas tariff s in Latin America and Middle East and North Africa may sometimes reach the US $0.50/m 3 level, virtually all utilities surveyed in East Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, and Subs-Saharan Africa are below this level. Th is has implications for the sustainability of the utilities (see below). 35 In many countries, there may be "parallel" charges beyond offi cial connection fees. Side payments are frequently mentioned as necessary to obtain a connection in the fi rst place. 
Alternative providers
As frequently mentioned in this paper, alternative providers of water services have until recently received far less attention than utilities. It is thus diffi cult to assess with precision their numbers, market shares, etc. in various countries. However, a systematic review of the literature undertaken by the World Bank (Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005) provides precious information about the ranges of prices charged by private alternative providers. Th is information is summarized in the following graph, taken from that study (fi gure 9). Th e study confi rms that prices of alternative sources of drinking water tend to be higher than the price of water provided by utilities. Water provided by carters and tanker trucks is more expensive than that provided by pointsource vendors, which in turn are more expensive than private or public networks. Th e ranking of sources by price that can be deduced from fi gure 8 proves to be robust across continents (Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005) .
4-3 Household Expenditures on Water
Evidence presented in Komives and others (2005; p43-44) on three continents (South Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America) shows that monthly water expenditures of households tend to increase with income. However, the proportion of total income that is spent on water decreases with income. For households in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, the study reports average expenditures ranging between two per cent of income in South Asia and around 3.5% of income in Latin America and Eastern Europe. For households in the top quintile of the income distribution, those fi gures drop to, respectively, less than one per cent, one and a half per cent and two per cent. Th us, overall water expenses do not represent a high proportion of household incomes. In low-income countries, expenditures on food, for example, represent a far greater proportion of total expenditures. Given the huge diff erences in the price of water from public or private networks and alternative sources, one could think that households connected to the network incur lower expenditures on water than unconnected households. In fact, it turns out that being connected to the public network is not synonymous with having lower expenditures on water services, as fi gure 10 illustrates. Figure 10 shows that in three of the four countries examined, expenditures on water are roughly comparable for households having access to private connections and households relying on vendors. Only in Pakistan are the latter paying much more than the former. For the four countries, monetary expenditures tend to be lowest for households relying on other improved sources such as wells.
Many eff ects are at work:
Lower water prices translate into higher water consumption. Th e magnitude of this eff ect de-• pends on the price elasticity of demand for water. Easier physical access also translates into a lower opportunity cost of water, which tends to • increase consumption. Households having access to alternative improved sources such as wells often do not incur cash • expenditures for them (there may be a cost associated with the time spent in fetching the water, but it is not recorded in the household expenditures). Lastly, there are selection biases in the sense that the choice to connect to the network is not • exogenous. First, households paying less than others before a network connection is made accessible will have fewer incentives to connect; hence, the average expenditures of those not connected may be lower than what the average expenditures of all households would be if no household were connected. Second, as argued in section 3-1, some very poor households may prefer to trade time for money and choose not to connect, because they could not aff ord the monetary outlay implied by a connection.
Th ose intuitions are broadly consistent with the picture that emerges from a study of three cities in Kenya undertaken by the World Bank (Gulyani, Talukdar and Kariuki, 2005) . Figure 11 illustrates diff erences in outcomes between households, depending on their primary source of water. Very few poor households have a private connection. Daily water use is about the same for all types of households, except those with private connections that consume 40% more water than the others per capita. In spite of this, per capita expenditures are about the same for all types of households, regardless of their being connected or not. Lastly, the survey also reveals that all households connected or not, have to access water from diff erent sources, due inter alia to the poor reliability of piped water service. Nonetheless, there are signifi cant diff erences in average times spent to fetch water for the diff erent categories of households. Th e study found that some households chose to trade off time savings in exchange for low monetary costs. Specifi cally, unconnected households with long collection times were more likely to opt for the status quo, rather than pay for an improvement in their water service.
4-4 Th e Performance of Utilities
In most of the regions of the world, prices charged by utilities are lower than costs. Th e aforementioned worldwide survey of utility companies by Global Water Intelligence used the information on tariff s to assess the degree of sustainability of utilities, based on normative criteria. Th e study found that overall, only 39% of utilities were charging tariff s that allowed them to fully recover short-run and long-run costs (Komives and others, 2005) . Even in the OECD, only half of the utilities achieved this target. By contrast, among the Median household monthly expenditure (US $)
In-house water tap Vendor Other improved utilities surveyed in Africa, none covered even their operating and maintenance costs (fi gure 12). Th ese fi ndings, although they may not refl ect particular cases of well-run utilities not included in the survey sample, 36 provide a useful benchmark and complement and confi rm those from earlier, more localized, studies.
Th us, due to the low tariff s practiced, utilities worldwide are in structural need of subsidies to balance their budgets. Th is is not, however, the whole story. Additional subsidies are needed because of technical and commercial losses that drive a wedge between the theoretical revenues that utilities could achieve, given the prevailing tariff s, and their real revenues.
Available studies suggest that the effi ciency of utilities varies massively between countries. In Africa, the technical and commercial performances of utilities are often very low. As an illustration, a report from IUCN (IUCN, 2002) on South Africa puts numbers on the various stages between production and revenue collection for a typical water utility in that country (fi gure 13). Technical and commercial losses represent 60% of total water produced. Figures mentioned for other African countries are even higher than those. In Kenya, it has been estimated than less than 17% of water is paid for in Mombasa and less than 32% in Nairobi (Gulyani, Talukdar and Kariuki, 2005) .
Th e logical consequence of these losses is that the portion of the subsidies paid by governments to utilities (assuming they eff ectively maintain utilities solvent) which actually reaches households is very low. Put diff erently, most of the government transfers are wasted due to technical and commercial ineffi ciencies.
Th e way subsidies are fi nanced varies across countries. We refer the reader to Komives and others (2005) for detailed country examples. It is interesting to note though, that both cross-subsidies and subsidies fi nanced by external transfers to utilities with the help of ad hoc mechanisms have faced diffi culties.
Cross-subsidies face three types of problems. First, as mentioned in section 3, the division of consumers into subsidized and subsidizing categories in a way that allows a balancing of the costs (no net defi cit 36 Africa is very heterogeneous in this respect. For example, some utilities in South Africa have been running for decades without government subsidies. Nevertheless, compared to other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is a very specifi c case. Tariffs are enough for O&M and partial capital costs Tariffs are enough to cover most O&M costs Tariffs are too low to cover basic O&M costs 
Typical Components of a Domestic Water Supply Balance in South Africa
Source: IUCN (2002) for the utility from cross-subsidies) is hard to achieve. 37 Over time, such a system faces two threats. First, in some contexts the categories defi ning eligibility for the subsidy may be subject to manipulation by interest groups. Second, consumers with alternative supply possibilities (e.g. fi rms, which typically pay higher prices than consumers) and facing high tariff s may opt out of the system. Both occurrences can leave in the system a growing proportion of subsidized consumers. Problems of this nature with cross-subsidies in Colombia are described in Komives and others (2005; Box 6.1, p105) . In that country, water utilities suff er structural losses as a result of the subsidy scheme (equal to 20 per cent of sector turnover in water), and it is necessary for the national government to step in and help cover those losses.
A general problem when subsidies take the form of budget balancing subsidies to utilities is that the possibility of obtaining external budgetary support creates a disincentive for utilities to improve their performance.
4-5 Households' Need for Subsidies and Willingness to Pay for Improved Water Services
As discussed in section 3, the question of which categories of the population should be the target of water subsidies should be answered on the basis of empirical data, relating most of all to local income distributions and patterns of expenditures. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the available local studies on this issue, and the reader is referred to references in Komives and others (2005) . An alternative approach to evaluating the adequacy of tariff s and the need for subsidies is to assess the willingness of households to pay for improved services. Th e reader is again referred to Komives and others (2005) for a review of the existing studies. Interestingly, available studies seem to suggest that consumers would often be willing to pay for signifi cantly higher tariff s than those charged by utilities, in exchange for improved reliability of service.
However, normative approaches based on the notion that expenditures for water should not represent more than a certain percentage of income continue to be widely used. Th is type of approach is interesting in order to compare diff erent countries, regions, and cities in terms of aff ordability of water services. Such an approach has been used in a study by Foster and Yepes (2005) . Th ey start by defi ning a "minimal" or subsistence water consumption, the provision of which to every household may represent what a benevolent government might think of as a valid policy objective. By varying the cost of this subsistence quantity, the authors assess, on the basis of income distributions, how many households would end up spending more than fi ve per cent of their income paying for it. Th e results, illustrated in the following fi gure taken from Komives and others (2005) , illustrate the potential sensitivity of water tariff issues, by showing that high tariff s have the potential to bring basic water expenses to levels that may be judged "too high" socially and politically.
It is interesting to compare these results with the actual price of water charged by utilities. If water were priced at levels that ensure fi nancial sustainability for the utility (e.g. US $1/m 3 ), the price of a typical subsistence water quantity (e.g. ten cubic meters per month) would reach US $10. At this level, more than 30 per cent of households in East Asia, and more than 50 per cent in Africa and India, would pay more than fi ve per cent of their incomes for it. However, as we have seen above, tariff s eff ectively charged by utilities are often far below cost-recovery levels. For example, taking the average of prices reported for Africa in the GWI study (US $0.10/m 3 ), the price of the ten cubic meters would be only US $1. At this level, according to Foster and Yepes, less than fi ve per cent of African households would pay more than fi ve per cent of their incomes for it (fi gure 14).
Interestingly, this latter fi gure is much lower than the typical percentage of households connected to the network that are subsidized (see below). Notwithstanding detailed investigations at the country or city level which as argued above should constitute a necessary step to the design of any subsidy mechanism, this result suggests that there is room for improvement in the way tariff s and subsidies are practiced. If subsidies are to address only aff ordability concerns, they probably could be much better targeted than they currently are. Utilities could probably increase their unsubsidized tariff s (thus progressing towards cost recovery) without jeopardizing the fi nancial health of most currently subsidized households.
4-6 Th e Performance of Water Subsidies
Th is section examines various aspects of the performance of water subsidies. We do not attempt a systematic examination of all the criteria identifi ed in section 3.7. Rather, we highlight issues which are prevalent in most of the developing world.
Th e fi rst important point is that consumption subsidies delivered through low tariff s (e.g. IBT), which are the most prevalent subsidies worldwide, are typically not well targeted to the poorest households. Th is is because, as mentioned in section 3.3, several hurdles distort the distribution of such subsidies away from the poor:
Th e proportion of households having potential access to the network is often higher for non-• poor households than for poor households; Th e same is true for the proportion of households that choose to connect to the network, given • access; Non-poor households connected to the network often consume more than poor households. • Th us, they will receive a greater proportion of the subsidies, since those are based on unit tariff s.
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38 Lastly, it can also be the case that poor households are less metered than non-poor households and thus are unable to benefi t from consumption subsidies. In such a case, the outcome would depend on the relative values of the fi xed charge for unmetered water use and the tariff for metered use. An example from Cape Verde, drawn from Komives and others (2005) , illustrates the cumulative eff ect of these hurdles on the distribution of subsidies. Th e prevailing tariff structure in Cape Verde was an IBT. Poor households had signifi cantly less frequent access to the public network than the whole population. Among those with access, the choice to connect was half as frequent among poor households. Th ese "connection factors" alone biased the distribution of subsidies towards non-poor households. Moreover, poor households connected to the network were found to consume only half as much water as the whole population of connected households. Even though, through the IBT structure, the resulting subsidy rate was higher for the former, this did not compensate for the diff erence in consumption. As a result of these successive hurdles, the ratio of subsidies going to an average poor households to those going to the average household was only 1:4 (fi gure 15).
Th ese conclusions are not unique to the case of Cape Verde. Indeed, one of the main lessons from the World Bank review study is that access factors (including metering) constitute the main constraint to reaching the poor with consumption subsidies through low tariff s.
Another feature of the IBTs which are prevalent around the world is that they are inherently badly targeted, because the size of the fi rst block (the most subsidized one) is too large, often well beyond commonly accepted subsistence levels. As a result, a substantial proportion of households, and not only the most poor, fall into the fi rst consumption block and end up paying subsidized tariff s on their whole water consumption.
Th e second important lesson is that administrative targeting can signifi cantly improve the performance of tariff -based subsidies. As discussed in section 3, there is a range of targeting methods, going from categorical targeting popular in the former Soviet Union, to selection based on family structure and location, with the most sophisticated methods relying on means testing. Selection based on family size alone is usually found to perform poorly in targeting the poorest households. Th e power of geographic targeting depends in large measure on the correlation between poverty and location of households. It is thus clear that the level of detail of geographic information available to the administration will play a crucial role in defi ning adequate priority areas for subsidy eligibility. Geographic targeting has given interesting results in Nepal (Komives and others, 2005) , but seems to have limited potential in Colombia and Senegal. In the last country, the examination of individual water consumptions reveals that although the average consumption did not vary much across most of the neighborhoods, there were huge variations of individual consumptions within neighborhoods (Lauria, Hopkins and Debomy, 2005) . In such a case, targeting based solely on geography will fail to identify the poorest households.
Another feature that clearly emerges from the review of existing studies is that water consumption subsidies are not a good redistribution tool. First, as mentioned above, water expenditures typically represent a low proportion of the household's budget. Second, access factors biased against the poor make subsidies through low water tariff s very unlikely to reach the poor. Th ird, correctly identifying poor households is often diffi cult to achieve in developing country context.
A fi nal point is that connection subsidies are not very common, although the potential benefi ts of such subsidies may in many cases be far important than their costs. As discussed at length in section 3-1, the value to a household of a connection to improved water service can be seen as a stream of benefi ts which are a complex function of direct net savings or expenses from buying sources from alternative providers or fetching it from elsewhere (potentially allowing a reallocation of consumption); of indirect benefi ts in terms of time freed up to get water into the household; and of other indirect benefi ts related for example, to improved health or education outcomes.
Studies which try to quantify all those benefi ts are rare. Most of the existing studies only consider one aspect. At the macro level, a study by WHO (Hutton and Haller, 2004 ) presents benefi t-cost ratios for diff erent types of intervention in water and sanitation for diff erent regions of the world. Th eir estimates are often high, ranging from fi ve to 11 in most cases. However, they do not include the value of savings due to lower water prices. 39 Considering only the savings associated with connection to the water network in Niamey and others (forthcoming, quoted in Komives and others, 2005) fi nd that the poor would save about US$0.75-$1.00 per cubic meter by connecting to the water system. Th e yearly savings for a household consuming ten cubic meters a month is equal to between one-quarter and more than one-half the fee charged to obtain a connection, depending on the defi nition of poverty adopted in the analysis. In this case, the net present value of these cost savings quickly exceeds the cost of connection.
From these results, it seems clear that the potential of subsidies to the extension of the water network and to connection should be explored more than is currently the case.
4-7 Towards A Broader View of Government Interventions Aimed at Increasing Access to Improved Water Services
Th e traditional paradigm of consumption subsidies passed on to consumers through utilities via low tariff s has repeatedly shown its limits. In many countries, most of the subsidies given to utilities have been ab-sorbed by ineffi ciencies, rather than passed on to consumers. In Africa in particular, access has remained low and is systematically lower for poor households than for the rest of the population. Due to the need to rely on other types of providers, many consumers pay for their water a substantially higher price than they would if the service provided by the utilities was universal and reliable. Yet, there is generally no subsidy going to households not connected to the network.
Overall, the evidence presented above in this section suggests that: (i) In many contexts, households would be willing to pay higher prices for improved services, thus potentially alleviating the burden on the utilities (and government) budget; (ii) Policies should be focused on increasing access to improved drinking water, rather than subsidizing consumption of tapped water provided by public utilities.
Public interventions should aim at balancing a range of other levers, such as providing connection subsidies; providing diff erentiated services; and incorporating alternative providers in the overall picture. Th e latter point includes devising an enabling framework for water provision; considering appropriate regulation of alternative providers; and considering the provision of subsidies to low-income households not relying on the public network.
Conclusion: Incorporating the Framework Into Water Sector Reforms in Africa
Th is paper has focused on presenting a framework to analyze water tariff s and subsidies as they exist today in developing countries. Th e main conclusion from the review of empirical evidence is that designing tariff s and subsidies for water has proven to be a challenge almost everywhere. Confl icting economic objectives (cost recovery versus aff ordable tariff s), social constraints (low incomes coupled with the fact that water is seen as a necessity), and incentives problems linked to the nature of the industry combine to create a range of confl icting issues, the importance of which varies across countries. Th e performance of water subsidies on diff erent criteria varies greatly according to country, design, fi nancing, etc. Nonetheless, a certain number of robust conclusions clearly emerge from the existing evidence.
First, aff ordability of public water services constitutes only one facet of the problem. Its relevance increases as access to piped water gets closer to universality. On the contrary, in many countries and in Africa in particular, access to improved water services continues to be the main constraint. Provision of access has the potential to improve welfare considerably through, e.g., allowing the poor to shift to improved quality public water from alternative supply sources, improving health outcomes and freeing time for education and income-generating activities.
Second, in most countries water tariff s are not a good redistribution tool. Th is poor performance relative to other subsidy mechanisms is due to many factors, including its indirect nature; the small proportion of poor households that are connected; and the relatively small share of water expenditures in household budgets. Th us, redistribution per se should not be the aim of water consumption subsidies.
Th ird, notwithstanding the argument above, there is scope for public intervention in both ensuring that poor households can eventually get access to improved water sources and that water tariff s are not too high for the poor. But individual household connections are only one of the ways by which this can be achieved. Other forms of provision need to be considered as possible alternatives.
Fourth, from the available evidence, willingness to pay for improved services may be higher than supposed (or conveniently assumed) by politicians or regulators in poor countries. It is thus probable that the low tariff s for water observed across the world do not adequately refl ect the capacity of households to pay for improved water provision, thus imposing unnecessary burdens on fi nancially overstretched utilities. At any rate, tariff s levels and associated subsidies should be determined on a case-by-case basis based on empirical data, rather than assumed willingness to pay.
Th is set of fi ndings may fall short of providing concrete recipes to policy makers. Water sector reforms do not begin with a tabula rasa but take place within the context of existing infrastructure and networks for water delivery, as well as preexisting tariff s and subsidies. 40 Th is section is devoted to the examination of the links between abstract principles and lessons, and the implementation of water reforms in developing countries. In short, how can the framework laid out above be successfully integrated into the design and implementation of water reforms?
As should be apparent from the analysis presented in the previous sections, political economy constraints are a major factor to take into account when trying to reform tariff s and subsidies in the water sector. Th is message is further reinforced by the examination of concrete project documents from multilateral donors such as the World Bank. Th is has a number of implications. First, reforms of tariff s and subsidies have to be gradual. Second, the idiosyncratic features of local markets, including income distribution, water tariff s, and the prevailing institutional arrangements for water delivery, determine in large part the limits within which transition paths from old conditions to new conditions have to be designed. Th e ambition of this section is not to cover any particular country circumstances in detail. Rather, focusing on Africa, we want to highlight issues that seem relevant for water reforms more or less across the board, although of course to varying degrees depending on the country examined. Having done that, we present some tentative recommendations.
5-1 Water Reforms in Africa: Some Political Economy Issues
Maybe the most urgent and general problem in the context of water provision in Africa is how to cope with the rapid urbanization which has been occurring across the continent. Urban areas in Africa are bearing the brunt of demographic pressure, facing increased demand for urban services as rural to urban migrations continue to feed the rapid growth of cities. As emphasized in recent work (Fay and Opal, 2002) , in most of Africa in the 1990s, urbanization was not accompanied by income growth, which has compounded the diffi culties of providing adequate services to the major part of the population. As an example, in the case of Dakar, Senegal, it is estimated that 100,000 to 120,000 new migrants come to the city each year (Lauria, Hopkins, and Debomy, 2005) . Relevant to water and infrastructure in general, most of this sustained urbanization has occurred in an extra-legal context, meaning that most African governments have not been able to off er incoming migrants adequate facilities in terms of water, sanitation, roads, as well as other basic amenities. Almost by defi nition, migrants coming to the periphery of cities face the most diffi cult conditions in terms of access to water. First, peri-urban neighborhoods are not likely to be connected to public networks, given the frequent backlogs and lags between the physical occupation of new areas and the eff ective provision of public water services. Second, most of the urbanization is illegal in one way or another, 41 resulting in legal obstacles for utilities to provide services to residents. Th is is an acute problem in various countries.
Another clear constraint which manifests itself across the board in Africa is the precarious fi nancial status of most utilities. Many utilities do not even recover operating and maintenance costs. In those cases, how to fi nance and speed up the fi nancing of network extensions? Although ad hoc solutions have been devised, reliance on external grants remains the rule for most of the investments. Th is lack of fi nancial sustainability results in so-called "low-equilibrium traps", whereby utilities cannot adequately maintain and extent the network; the quality of services deteriorates; households or industries have to secure consumption from other providers; the most well-off consumers opt out of the system, which further undermines the viability of the utility. Related to this fi nancial sustainability equation are, on one hand, questions of capacity of consumers to pay for services, and on the other, effi ciency and commercial performance of utilities. On the consumer side, it is worth mentioning once again that a key indicator of the extent of aff ordability is the proportion of households that do not connect to the network, even though the possibility exists. Further evidence on the reasons why households choose not to connect to the network is needed, 42 along with traditional data on income and expenditures, to improve our understanding of the extent of aff ordability constraints. On the utility side, what seems clear from the evidence accumulated in Africa is that substantial improvements in the fi nancial health of utilities could in many cases be reached by working on improving the physical and commercial sides of water production and delivery.
5-2 Recommendations
It is outside the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive list of possible actions by governments willing to reform water tariff s and subsidies. Such a task would indeed be formidable, given the broad range of actions that are at the disposal of governments in this domain. Th ose include in particular core normative decisions such as allocation of water between sectors or types of consumers; water pricing; the design of water subsidies; and refi ning the role of the State as a utility regulator and incentive provider. But they also include broader enabling actions such as devising adequate frameworks for cooperation between levels of governments in the delivery of services; giving support to alternative providers; and getting communities involved in the decisions regarding the delivery of basic services. Rather, this fi nal section aims at providing a limited number of lessons and recommendations that emerge from the available empirical analyses and seem robust to a wide range of specifi c circumstances.
1) More data are needed
Micro-level data on household incomes, water consumption, and expenditure patterns, as well as assessment studies, are a prerequisite to sound policy formulation in the water sector. In particular, they should be used to determine the level and structure of the water tariff s that can be supported locally; the necessity of subsidies; and the type of subsidies needed and their probable incidence. In many contexts, such basic data and assessments are lacking. Data are also needed on a continuous time basis to monitor the subsidy program or to put in place administrative selection mechanisms.
Th e initial assessment should pay as much attention to the aff ordability of the connections as to the aff ordability of the service itself. Connections often entail upfront costs, both in the form of company charges and in the need for complementary household investments. Th ese costs can be prohibitive for poor households with no or limited access to borrowing. As mentioned above, more data and studies are needed on the extent to which and on the reasons why households with potential access to the public water network choose not to connect. Lack of uptake by poor households is potentially a major factor in the regressivity of consumption subsidies.
2) Many of the current subsidy schemes would need to be better designed in order to improve targeting and increase coverage of poor populations Water tariff s and subsidies are only a facet of development challenges in water and sanitation. In order to devise more equitable schemes, governments need to consider the big picture, including all the factors that potentially infl uence the provision of basic services to the poor: Th ose include in particular: low or very low overall access rates; • disparities in rates of access between urban, peri-urban and rural areas; • legal and administrative constraints (e.g. urban planning and zoning documents in peri-urban • areas; legal limitations on the provision of basic services to dwellings not complying fully with the law) ; unclear and/or anti-poor regulation of the sector (e.g. by giving legal monopolies to utilities over • areas which they currently do not serve).
3) In order to increase access to safe drinking water, governments need to consider a broader array of interventions than solely subsidizing utility companies,
In many contexts, and notwithstanding varying local situations, policies should be focused on increasing access to improved drinking water, rather than subsidizing utilities. Public interventions should aim at balancing a range of other levers, such as:
considering how to speed up extensions of the network, especially in fast growing peri-urban • areas ; providing connection subsidies to households who cannot aff ord connections to an already • existing network; providing diff erentiated services, associated with tariff s refl ecting the diff erence in service qual-• ity; incorporating alternative providers in the overall picture, including devising an enabling frame-• work for water provision; considering appropriate regulation of alternative providers; and considering the case for providing subsidies to low-income households not relying on the public network.
4) Financing needs of utilities need to be separated from subsidy issues
As briefl y explained in this paper, in many countries the "traditional" way to deal with utilities has consisted in mandating low tariff s, in exchange for compensating for the losses incurred through various means (see section 3-4 above). Such transfers to utilities mix two diff erent fi nancial issues, i.e. utility fi nancing needs and social equity considerations. Due to political economy problems of various kinds, in practice this has often meant unfunded subsidies, lack of incentives for utility effi ciency, or both, resulting in declining quality of service which further undermines the viability of the utility. For the regulator or the government, it is diffi cult to sort out, in the fi nancing requests of the utilities, how much relates to effi ciency problems and how much relates to actual consumer subsidies.
As mentioned above, social concerns are legitimate, but the responsibility to assist poor customers should belong to the government, not to the utility. Utilities should be allowed to charge sustainable tariff s (although properly monitored), and subsidies to needy customers should be provided by the appropriate level of government. Th e advantages of such an unbundling are manifold: sustainable tariff s are the best guarantee to sustained services in the medium to long run; • such a separation makes consumer subsidies more transparent, • the framework provides better incentives for utilities and governments. • Better incentives and increased transparency may constitute the main reasons why multilateral donors have increasingly shifted their projects towards output-based fi nance and subsidies. In this framework, project fi nancing and subsidies are delivered based on the completion of performance targets in terms of, e.g., households connected to the network, rather than provided as general support to the utility. It may also be noted that the recommendation to separate subsidies from fi nance constitutes a basic paradigm in other sectors, such as housing. 43 43 For example, it is generally recommended, when the economic environment allows it, to substitute interest rate subsidies on mortgages, delivered through bank intermediaries, with direct (so-called "upfront") subsidies which either increase the household down payment or come in the form of a deduction from payments of a mortgage taken at the market rate.
